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DON’T SAY DEPRESSION: SPECIFIC DIAGNOSABLE
INJURIES UNDER THE WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST
DISCRIMINATION’S PRIVILEGE STATUTE
Jack Miller*
Abstract: In 2018, the Washington State Legislature amended the Washington Law
Against Discrimination (WLAD) to prevent automatic waivers of physician- and
psychologist-patient privileges when plaintiffs claim non-economic, emotional distress
damages. This legislation appears to be in response to the Washington Court of Appeals’
decision Lodis v. Corbis Holding, Inc.,1which held that a plaintiff waives their2 patient- and
psychologist-privilege merely by alleging emotional distress damages. The new law, RCW
49.60.510, prevents waiver unless the plaintiff alleges a specific diagnosable injury, relies on
the testimony of a healthcare or psychiatric expert, or claims a “failure to accommodate a
disability or discrimination on the basis of a disability.” RCW 49.60.510 does not specify
what constitutes a specific diagnosable injury, but the legislative history suggests the
Legislature was attempting to shift WLAD’s privilege law towards a standard similar to one
used in federal courts. This Comment explores the federal court’s psychotherapist-patient
privilege3 waiver and argues that federal courts’ privilege jurisprudence can provide some
clarity to the ambiguity of “specific diagnosable” injuries. It further argues that courts’
failure to consider this legislative goal risks a return to the Lodis-era waiver standard.

INTRODUCTION
Debate surrounds what role physician- and psychotherapist-patient
privilege should play in litigation where a plaintiff seeks emotional
distress damages.4 Defendants argue the privileged communications are
*

J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2020. I wish to thank
Professor Helen Anderson for her valuable guidance and expertise in this area. I also wish to
particularly thank the Notes and Comments team on the Washington Law Review for their support
throughout this process.
1. 172 Wash. App. 835, 292 P.3d 779 (2013).
2. Washington Law Review uses “they” and “their” instead of “he” or “she” to avoid genderspecific language.
3. Unlike state courts, federal courts do not recognize a physician-patient privilege. EDWARD J.
IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES 643 (3d ed. 2016) (“[T]he federal
courts have largely refused to recognize the [physician-patient] privilege.”).
4. See, e.g., Beth S. Frank, Protecting the Privacy of Sexual Harassment Plaintiffs: The
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege and Recovery of Emotional Distress Damages Under the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 639, 663 (2001) (arguing that plaintiffs suing under Title VII
and claiming emotional distress damages should not automatically waive psychotherapist-patient
privilege); 25 TOBY PIERING, NEW LAW LIMITS DISCLOSURE OF MEDICAL RECORDS IN
DISCRIMINATION CASES, WASH. EMP. L. LETTER 1 (M. Lee Smith Publishers LLC, Brentwood,

1451

18 - Miller(2).docx (Do Not Delete)

10/21/2019 5:27 PM

1452

[Vol. 94:1451

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

relevant to causation because the alleged emotional distress might be
caused or exacerbated by pre-existing medical or emotional conditions.5
Plaintiffs claim, on the other hand, that they should be allowed to seek
emotional distress damages without disclosing their communications
with counselors and doctors because such discovery is unnecessarily
invasive.6 In federal court, much of the debate arises from civil rights
litigation.7 Some argue plaintiffs will be unwilling to pursue civil rights
cases if privilege is waived.8
In 2018, Washington State took a side in the privilege debate. The
Washington State Legislature enacted an amendment to its Law Against
Discrimination (“WLAD”).9 This amendment, RCW 49.60.510, altered
the common-law waiver standard concerning the physician- and
psychologist-patient privilege waiver adopted in Lodis v. Corbis
Holdings, Inc.10 Under Lodis, a plaintiff waived their physician- or
psychologist-patient privilege merely by seeking noneconomic damages
for emotional distress.11 The new statute prevents waiver under such
circumstances.12 Instead, in order for there to be a waiver of privilege,
the plaintiff must (1) allege a “specific diagnosable physical or
psychiatric injury” proximately caused by the defendant, (2) rely “on the
records or testimony of a health care provider or expert witness to seek
general damages,” or (3) allege “failure to accommodate a disability” or
allege “discrimination on the basis of a disability.”13
This Comment focuses on the first exception: when the plaintiff
alleges a “specific diagnosable physical or psychiatric injury.”14 What
constitutes a specific diagnosable injury is far from clear and the new

T.N. 2018) (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.510 (2019) and arguing that RCW 49.60.510
undermines employers’ ability to defend themselves from discrimination and harassment suits).
5. PIERING, supra note 4, at 1.
6. See Frank, supra note 4, at 663 (arguing courts should not permit the invasion of a Title VII
plaintiff’s privacy through discovery of mental health records).
7. Helen A. Anderson, The Psychotherapist Privilege: Privacy and “Garden Variety” Emotional
Distress, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 117, 117 (2013).
8. Frank, supra note 4, at 663 (“If courts determine that a victim waives the psychotherapistpatient privilege . . . when she [brings] a civil rights action, then fewer victims will act as ‘private
attorneys general’ for fear of invasion of privacy.”).
9. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.510 (2019).
10. 172 Wash. App. 835, 855, 292 P.3d 779, 791 (2013).
11. Id.
12. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.510(1).
13. Id. § 49.60.510(1)(a)–(c).
14. Id. § 49.60.510(1)(a).
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statute provides no guidance.15 For example, it is unclear if a plaintiff
waives privilege when the alleged emotional experience is symptomatic
of a psychiatric condition.16 A reasonable interpretation of the statute
would require a plaintiff to allege in their complaint a specific
condition—like Post-Traumatic Distress Disorder—to waive privilege.
Still, an equally reasonable interpretation of the statute would find
waiver if a plaintiff said they felt anxious because General Anxiety
Disorder is a diagnosable condition.17 Fundamentally, this Comment
seeks to address the ambiguity of the new statute and provide a
framework for parties and courts interpreting RCW 49.60.510.
RCW 49.60.510 is best understood in the context of the privilege
debate outlined above. It mirrors the compromise adopted by some
federal courts known as the “garden variety” standard.18 These federal
courts allow a plaintiff to maintain privilege while seeking emotional
distress damages if the alleged emotional distress is “garden variety.”19
Garden variety distress has many definitions,20 but is generally defined
as the emotional experience an ordinary person would experience as a
result of the defendant’s conduct.21 The garden variety standard seeks to
allow plaintiffs to recover for “incidental” or “intrinsic” emotional
distress while maintaining their psychotherapist-patient privilege.22
Still, the garden variety standard, although attempting to appease both
sides, is not without criticism. For example, the garden variety standard
does not readily clarify which emotional experiences are considered
garden variety, and which are not.23 Therefore, it does not provide useful
guidance to litigants as to whether privilege will be waived.24

15. See id. § 49.60.510.
16. See id.
17. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASSOC., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
432 (4th ed. 1994).
18. See Anderson, supra note 7, at 137 (arguing the garden variety standard is a compromise
“between the concerns for fairness to defendants and concerns about plaintiffs’ privacy”).
19. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Cassil, 216 F.R.D. 632, 637 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (discussing garden
variety standard used by some federal courts).
20. See Anderson, supra note 7, at 138–39 (listing the various definitions of garden variety
emotional distress).
21. Id. at 137.
22. Id. at 138 (“Concerns about routine findings of waiver even for ‘incidental’ or ‘intrinsic’
emotional distress damages seem to underlie the garden variety approach.”).
23. See id. at 142 (discussing the uncertainty the garden variety standard imposes on availability
of privilege).
24. Id. (“Measured by the judge or magistrate’s personal yardstick of normal emotional distress,
the garden variety standard is unknowable in advance.”).
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This Comment argues that the “specific diagnosable” injury
requirement of RCW 49.60.510 similarly attempts to allow plaintiffs to
recover for incidental emotional distress damages without waiving
privilege. In that way, the new statute adopts the garden variety standard
and federal case law may provide some guidance to determine the scope
of specific diagnosable injuries under WLAD. However, the statute uses
“diagnosable injury” and not “garden variety.”25 It remains to be
determined how much diagnosable injuries and garden variety emotional
responses diverge from one another. Still, garden variety and
“diagnosable injury” point to the same dichotomy: emotional responses
that are merely incidental to discrimination and those that are something
more substantial. With that in mind, this Comment seeks to provide a
historical framework for parties and courts, in order to properly interpret
RCW 49.60.510 going forward. Because no appellate court has
interpreted the new statute yet, this Comment cannot say with certainty
what experiences constitute a specific diagnosable injury; however, by
establishing a framework of federal garden variety case law and
Washington privilege law, this Comment can provide guidance for
courts and practitioners concerned with the scope of RCW 49.60.510.
Part I briefly explains the WLAD. Part II discusses Washington’s
privilege law and the standard prior to RCW 49.60.510. It also touches
briefly on the standards used in federal court, including the garden
variety standard and the policy considerations concerning privilege
waiver. Part III explores the history of RCW 49.60.510’s enactment.
Part IV argues that RCW 49.60.510 was intended to adopt something
akin to the federal garden variety standard and that courts need to
consider the legislative history of RCW 49.60.510. Courts failing to
consider this historical backdrop risk misconstruing the legislative intent
of RCW 49.60.510 and defeating its purpose: to allow plaintiffs to
testify regarding incidental emotional harm without waiving privilege.
I.

THE WASHINGTON LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION

Washington State enacted the WLAD with the purpose of preventing
discrimination.26 The statute provides a private cause of action for
persons injured by unlawful discrimination.27 This cause of action allows

25. See WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.510 (2019).
26. Id. § 49.60.010.
27. Id. § 49.60.030(2).
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an individual to be awarded “actual damages” sustained as a result of
discriminatory conduct.28
The statute does not define “actual damages.”29 However, courts have
interpreted “actual damages” to include “back pay, front pay, mental
anguish, and emotional distress.”30 A plaintiff may be awarded damages
if the plaintiff can prove the damages were proximately caused by the
discriminatory actions.31 Therefore, a plaintiff is entitled to emotional
distress damages so long as the plaintiff can establish that they suffered
emotional distress proximately caused by the defendant’s discrimination.
In fact, a plaintiff does not need expert testimony to prove emotional
distress damages.32
WLAD commands courts to construe its provisions liberally.33
Consequently, courts avoid any statutory construction that “narrow[s]
the coverage of the law.”34 This preserves the legislative intent to
eradicate discrimination in Washington.35 Furthermore, when
Washington courts have not directly dealt with a legal issue under the
statute, courts look to federal discrimination law for persuasive
authority.36
II. TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE, GENERALLY
Privilege prevents compulsory disclosure of certain communications
and related information during the course of litigation.37 Often, privilege
impacts discovery during litigation by preventing some information from
being known to opposing parties.38 Privileging information is a policy
28. Id.
29. Blaney v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 114 Wash. App. 80, 97, 55 P.3d
1208, 1216 (2002).
30. Id.
31. Martini v. Boeing Co., 137 Wash. 2d 357, 371, 971 P.2d 45, 52 (1999) (“[D]amages must be
proximately caused by the wrongful action, resulting directly from the violation of RCW 49.60.”).
32. Negron v. Snoqualmie Valley Hosp., 86 Wash. App. 579, 588, 936 P.2d 55, 60 (1997).
33. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.020 (2019).
34. Marquis v. City of Spokane, 130 Wash. 2d 97, 108, 922 P.2d 43, 49 (1996).
35. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.020 (“The provisions of [RCW 49.60] shall be construed liberally
for the accomplishment of the purposes thereof.”).
36. Xieng v. Peoples Nat’l Bank of Wash., 120 Wash. 2d 512, 531, 844 P.2d 389, 399 (1993)
(“[I]n the absence of adequate state authority, federal authority is persuasive in interpreting RCW
49.60.”).
37. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060 (2019) (listing circumstances under which individuals
will not be compelled to testify).
38. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged
matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense . . . .”); WASH. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (“Parties
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decision,39 and there are different forms of privilege, including attorneyclient privilege, spousal privilege, physician-patient privilege,
psychotherapist or psychologist-patient privilege, and many others.40 Not
every state or court recognizes every privilege, and they vary both in
terms of what information is privileged and under what circumstances
privilege applies.41 Privilege no longer applies when the party who holds
the privilege waives it.42
This Comment concerns Washington’s physician-patient,43 counselorpatient,44 and psychologist-patient privileges45 as they pertain to suits
arising under WLAD.46 In particular, it addresses how RCW 49.60.510
impacts the waiver standards of these privileges. This Part addresses
how privilege operates, at a general level. It begins with a discussion of
the interaction between Washington discovery rules and privilege law. It
then discusses federal psychotherapist-patient privilege waiver
standards.47 Finally, it addresses the policy concerns of privilege law and
how privilege affects litigation.

may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action . . . .”).
39. 1 GEORGE E. DIX ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 466–67 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 7th ed.
2013) (“[R]ules of privilege are not without a rationale. Their warrant is the protection of interests
and relationships which, rightly or wrongly, are regarded as of sufficient social importance to justify
some sacrifice of availability of evidence relevant to the administration of justice.”); EDWARD J.
IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES 4 (3d ed. 2016) (“[P]rivilege law
concerns ‘extrinsic social policy.’”).
40. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 3, at 332 (“All states recognize some form of the traditional
spousal, attorney-client, and clergy privileges . . . . Further, as the Supreme Court noted in Jaffee,
the states are in accord that there should be a psychotherapy privilege. The vast majority also
enforce a general medical privilege.”).
41. DIX, supra note 39, at 490 (“State patterns in the recognition of privileges vary greatly.”);
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 3, at 326 (“[T]he state bodies of privilege law differ with respect to both
the degree of statutorification and some of the specific privileges recognized.”).
42. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 3, at 1150 (“It is not a foregone conclusion that every privilege is
waivable.”).
43. WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(4) (2019).
44. Id. § 5.60.060(9).
45. WASH. REV. CODE § 18.83.110 (2019).
46. For brevity and consistency with federal terminology, I will refer to counselor-patient
privilege and psychologist-patient privilege collectively as psychotherapist-patient privilege.
47. Federal courts do not recognize a physician-patient privilege. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 3.
However, they do recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege, which includes privileged
communications between psychiatrists, psychologists, and other licensed counselors (like licensed
social workers) and their patients. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996) (establishing a
psychotherapist-patient privilege for confidential communications between patients and licensed
psychotherapists).
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Washington’s Discovery Rules and Privilege Law

Privilege limits the broad discovery rules operating in Washington
State.48 Parties may discover “any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . .”49
Though privilege statutes directly conflict with the broad discovery rules
operating in Washington State, Washington courts respect the
Legislature’s right to establish privilege.50 However, because privilege is
an affront to fair adjudication, Washington courts construe privilege
statutes narrowly by finding waivers.51 Commonly, courts throughout
the United States hold that placing health at issue in a lawsuit—by
alleging an injury, for example—waives privilege.52
Washington statutes privilege certain communications from
compulsory testimony.53 RCW 5.60.060 codifies many of these
privileges.54 This list includes the prohibition on testimony by both
treating physicians and mental health counselors.55 Certain situations
establish a waiver of these privileges. For example, a patient waives
their physician-patient privilege by placing their health at issue in the
lawsuit.56 In addition, a waiver of physician-patient privilege for one
physician constitutes a waiver of all physicians.57
Washington separately establishes psychologist-patient privilege.58
This statute states that communications between a client and
psychologist share the same protections as attorney-client
communications.59 Vocal communications with psychologists and
48. See Lowy v. PeaceHealth, 174 Wash. 2d 769, 776, 280 P.3d 1078, 1082 (2012).
49. WASH. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added).
50. State v. Harris, 51 Wash. App. 807, 812, 755 P.2d 825, 828 (1988).
51. Id.
52. See Ellen E. McDonnell, Certainty Thwarted: Broad Waiver Versus Narrow Waiver of the
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege After Jaffee v. Redmond, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1369, 1375 (2001).
53. See WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060 (2019); id. § 18.83.110 (2019).
54. See id. § 5.60.060 (entitled “Who is disqualified—Privileged communications”). This statute
contains the lion’s share of Washington’s statute-enacted privileges. It includes spousal privilege
(§ 5.60.060(1)),
attorney-client
privilege
(§ 5.60.060(2)(a)),
parent-child
privilege
(§ 5.60.060(2)(b)), clergy-penitent privilege (§ 5.60.060(3)), physician-patient privilege
(§ 5.60.060(4)), psychotherapist-patient privilege (§5.60.060(9)), and many more.
55. See id. § 5.60.060(4); § 5.60.060(9).
56. See id. § 5.60.060(4)(b) (“Ninety days after filing an action for personal injuries or wrongful
death, the claimant shall be deemed to waiver the physician-patient privilege.”); Carson v. Fine, 123
Wash. 2d 206, 213–14, 867 P.2d, 610, 615 (1994).
57. Carson, 123 Wash. 2d at 214, 867 P.2d at 615.
58. WASH. REV. CODE § 18.83.110 (2019).
59. Id.
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written counseling records pertaining to those communications are
privileged from discovery and admission in a court proceeding.60
The Washington State Supreme Court has found the psychologistpatient privilege and physician-patient privilege to be largely identical,
despite physician-patient privilege and psychologist-patient privilege
residing in different statutory schemes and the psychologist-patient
privilege having no statutory waiver carve-out.61 Extending this holding,
the Washington Court of Appeals, in Lodis v. Corbis Holdings, Inc.,62
held that claiming emotional distress damages places a plaintiff’s mental
health at issue in a proceeding.63 Thus, under Lodis, by claiming
emotional distress damages, the plaintiff waived their psychologistprivilege.64
Lodis involved an individual who filed suit against his employer
alleging age discrimination and retaliation under WLAD.65 The plaintiff,
Steven Lodis, sought emotional harm damages.66 During discovery,
Lodis refused to provide records relating to his past psychological
treatment, although he acknowledged he had received such treatment.67
Instead, he asserted that physician- and psychotherapist-patient privilege
prevented disclosure of the records.68 Due to Lodis’ refusal, the trial
court granted the defendant’s motion in limine to “preclude Lodis from
introducing evidence of his alleged emotional distress at trial through
testimony or documents.”69
On appeal, Lodis argued that a plaintiff should not waive
psychologist-patient privilege if they do “not allege a specific
psychiatric disorder, make[] no claim of an exacerbated preexisting
condition, and do[] not intend to rely on medical records or
60. See Redding v. Va. Mason Med. Ctr., 75 Wash. App. 424, 427, 878 P.2d 483, 485 (1994)
(“The attorney-client privilege extends to documents that contain a privileged communication. By
analogy, the psychologist-patient privilege claimed . . . applies to records of counseling to the extent
that they document statements . . . made during the counseling session.”).
61. Petersen v. State, 100 Wash. 2d 421, 429, 671 P.2d 230, 237–38 (1983) (“[RCW 18.83.110]
essentially provides the same protection to psychologist-patient communications as is provided by
RCW 5.60.060 for communications between physician and patient.”).
62. 172 Wash. App. 835, 292 P.3d 779 (2013).
63. Id., at 855, 292 P.3d at 791 (“Thus, when a plaintiff puts his mental health at issue by alleging
emotional distress, he waives his psychologist-patient privilege for relevant health records.”).
64. Id. Lodis was subsequently limited to this holding by RCW 49.60.510.
65. Id. at 841, 292 P.3d at 784.
66. Id. at 844, 292 P.3d at 785.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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testimony . . . .”70 Lodis relied on federal courts’ standards for privilege
waivers and argued Washington should adopt one of the narrower
federal privilege waiver standards.71 Under these standards, a plaintiff
must rely on the communications between a psychotherapist and the
plaintiff or must allege something more than a garden variety72
emotional response to waive privilege.73
The Court of Appeals disagreed.74 The court held that, because the
psychologist-patient and physician-patient privileges are essentially the
same, a plaintiff placing their mental health at issue also waives
psychologist-patient privilege.75 The court held it is irrelevant that the
plaintiff never intended to rely on past treatment with counselors in
establishing his emotional distress claim.76 Rather, by seeking noneconomic emotional distress damages, a plaintiff places their mental
health at issue and waives psychologist privilege.77 Thus, under Lodis,
even when a plaintiff does not claim a specific emotional injury, that
plaintiff waives their psychotherapist-patient privilege and must disclose
their communications with counselors.78
RCW 49.60.510 essentially abrogated the holding of Lodis—at least
to the extent it applies to cases arising under WLAD.79 Under the statute,
a plaintiff does not waive any privilege by alleging emotional distress
damages, unless an exception applies.80 An examination of federal
privilege waiver standards helps clarify the specific diagnosable injury
exception in the statute.81
B.

Federal Courts Psychotherapist-Privilege

The United States Supreme Court recognized psychotherapist-patient
privilege in Jaffee v. Redmond.82 When establishing a federal
70. Id. at 854, 292 P.3d at 790.
71. Id.
72. The garden variety distinction and how it applies to waiver is discussed in greater detail in
section II.B, infra.
73. Lodis, 172 Wash. App. at 855, 292 P.3d at 790.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 854, 292 P.3d at 790.
76. Id. at 855, 292 P.3d at 791.
77. Id. at 856, 292 P.3d at 791.
78. See id. at 855, 292 P.3d at 791.
79. See WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.510(1) (2019).
80. Id. § 49.60.510(1)(a)–(c).
81. Id. § 49.60.510(1)(a).
82. 518 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1996).
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psychotherapist-patient privilege, the Court described a number of
policy reasons to establish privilege. The Court stated that “[e]ffective
psychotherapy . . . depends upon an atmosphere of confidence and trust
in which the patient is willing to make a frank and complete disclosure
of facts, emotions, memories, and fears.”83 Furthermore, establishing
psychotherapist-patient privilege “serves the public interest by
facilitating the provision of appropriate treatment for individuals
suffering the effects of a mental or emotional problem.” 84 Additionally,
the Court mentioned that “if the purpose of the privilege is to be served,
the participants in the confidential conversation ‘must be able to predict
with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be
protected.’”85
Though the Court did not establish waiver in Jaffee, it hinted that
there may be circumstances under which waiver could occur.86 In the
absence of clear guidance from the Court concerning privilege waiver,
federal courts developed varying standards to determine when a plaintiff
has waived their psychotherapist-patient privilege.87 Three standards
have emerged88: a broad waiver, narrow waiver, and middle-ground
approach.89 Broad waiver stands for the principle that a plaintiff waives
their privilege “by merely asserting a claim for emotional damages.”90
This is akin to the stance the Washington State Court of Appeals took in
Lodis.91 The narrow waiver approach limits waiver to only situations
where a plaintiff relies on the privileged communications or information
in the course of litigation.92
The middle ground approach is predicated on the idea of garen variety
emotional harm and finds waiver only if the plaintiff alleges an
emotional harm greater than a garen variety response to the defendant’s
conduct.93 Essentially, the garden variety standard seeks to differentiate
emotional experiences that are incidental to the harm caused by the

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 10.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 17 n.14 (“Like other testimonial privileges, the patient may of course waive the protection.”).
McDonnell, supra note 52, at 1369.
Anderson, supra note 7, at 118; see also McDonnell, supra note 52, at 1370.
McDonnell, supra note 52, at 1370.
Id.
See Lodis v. Corbis Holdings, Inc., 172 Wash. App. 835, 855, 292 P.3d 779, 791 (2013).
McDonnell, supra note 52, at 1369.
See Fitzgerald v. Cassil, 216 F.R.D. 632, 638 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
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defendant’s conduct and those that are more severe.94 Garden variety
emotional distress is often described as “ordinary or commonplace
emotional distress.”95 Conversely, a non-garden variety emotional
response “may be complex, such as that resulting in a specific
psychiatric disorder.”96 Under the garden variety standard, a plaintiff
who alleges mere garden variety emotional distress does not waive their
psychotherapist-patient privilege.97 On the other hand, one who alleges
something more, such as a specific injury, does waive their privilege.98
C.

Policy Debate Surrounding Waiver

Commentators disagree as to whether privilege should be waived
when a plaintiff claims an emotional distress injury. Some commentators
claim that privilege is needed to encourage plaintiffs to bring suit
without “fear that their mental health with be placed on trial.”99 They
argue that, often, much of a plaintiff’s mental health records are
irrelevant to an emotional distress cause of action.100 Still, others argue
that, in the absence of waiver, defendants can be exposed to large
damage awards without the ability to explore causation.101 Further,
because the plaintiff alleges an emotional harm, the defendant cannot
explore other factors that might contribute to or cause the plaintiff’s
emotional state.102
In support of stronger privilege standards, one scholar, Beth S. Frank,
likens psychotherapist-patient privilege to Federal Rule of Evidence 412.
Rule 412 prohibits the admission of evidence of a sexual assault victim’s
sexual history by a defendant during a criminal case.103 In civil cases,
Rule 412 requires the probative value of a victim’s sexual history or
predisposition to substantially outweigh the “danger of harm to any
94. Anderson, supra note 7, at 138.
95. Id. at 637 (quoting Ruhlmann v. Ulster Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 194 F.R.D. 445, 449 n.6
(N.D.N.Y. 2000)).
96. Id. (quoting Ruhlmann, 194 F.R.D. at 449 n.6).
97. Id.
98. See id. (citing Ford v. Contra Costa Cty., 179 F.R.D. 579, 579 (N.D. Cal. 1998)).
99. Frank, supra note 4, at 663.
100. Id. at 664 (“[M]ental health records often contain personal and private information wholly
irrelevant to the civil rights claim.”).
101. Anderson, supra note 7, at 119 (noting how many laws or precedents limiting waiver of
privilege leave the “defendant . . . vulnerable to a large award but unable to fully explore issues such
as causation”).
102. PIERING, supra note 4.
103. FED. R. EVID. 412(a).

18 - Miller(2).docx (Do Not Delete)

10/21/2019 5:27 PM

1462

[Vol. 94:1451

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

victim and of unfair prejudice to any party” before the victim’s sexual
history is admissible.104 Beth S. Frank argues that often a plaintiff’s
mental history is wholly irrelevant to their claim.105 Yet, when waiver
occurs, the plaintiff is often exposed to a “piece-by-piece analysis of her
life,” despite its irrelevance to the claim.106 Thus, there is a concern that
exposure of a plaintiff’s past mental health treatment can prejudice an
emotional distress claim.107
Conversely, favoring broader waiver standards, commentators argue
that restricted waiver allows a plaintiff to cherry-pick testimony
concerning their emotional distress claim, while withholding other
factors that may contribute to the plaintiff’s perceived harm.108
According to them, medical issues may cause a plaintiff’s emotional
distress, rather than the defendant’s conduct.109 Thus, if a plaintiff does
not waive privilege when alleging emotional distress, the defendant will
not be able to inquire into these other factors to challenge causation of
the emotional distress.110
The garden variety standard attempts to balance these competing
concerns by limiting waiver to circumstances when a plaintiff claims
emotional stress beyond what a normal person would experience. Still,
the garden variety standard is criticized for failing to realistically capture
emotional responses to defendants’ conduct. For example, Professor
Helen A. Anderson suggests that the distinction between garden variety
emotional distress and a diagnosis or reliance on expert testimony to
support a claim is not a useful one.111 First, the distinction benefits
plaintiffs who have never been treated by a psychotherapist or whose
emotional distress appears normal to the court.112 Second, “garden

104. Id. at 412(b)(2).
105. Frank, supra note 4, at 664 (“[M]ental health records often contain personal and private
information wholly irrelevant to the civil rights claim.”).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. PIERING, supra note 4.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Anderson, supra note 7, at 139–40. Professor Anderson recognizes the need for a
compromise in implied waiver situations arising in civil rights litigation. Id. at 144. However,
concerns about variability in waiver findings and defendants’ exposure to potentially high damage
awards without the ability to defend themselves led her to propose a legislative solution. Id. at 152.
Under her proposed solution, plaintiffs could elect to forego seeking actual damages for a statutorily
capped amount of damages and maintain privilege. Id. at 153. If, however, the plaintiff elected to
seek actual damages, then they would face potential waiver. Id.
112. Id.
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variety” emotional distress is a legal fiction and the use of terms such as
“‘ordinary,’ ‘intrinsic,’ or ‘normal’ emotional harm has no firm basis in
reality.”113 Finally, the garden variety standard stigmatizes those who
experience so-called “abnormal” amounts of emotional distress because
the standard draws the line at normal/abnormal emotional distress.114
This results in “allow[ing] those who were less harmed, and those who
do not have serious psychological issues, to claim the privilege, while
forcing those who most value the privilege—those with significant
mental distress—to choose between claiming their actual damages and
waiving the privilege or simply claiming an ‘ordinary’ amount.”115
The garden variety standard is also criticized because of the
“imprecision and elasticity of the phrase ‘garden variety.’”116 Courts
vary in how they define the garden variety distinction.117 These varying
definitions lead to varying results in application.118 Regardless, the
garden variety standard has gained traction,119 and the Washington State
Legislature appears to have adopted it in some form by enacting RCW
49.60.510.
III. ENACTMENT OF RCW 49.60.510
RCW 49.60.510 was enacted120 to address perceived invasive
discovery practices into plaintiffs’ mental and medical treatment
history.121 RCW 49.60.510 essentially abrogated Lodis v. Corbis
Holdings as it pertained to the WLAD.122 The statute established that, by
113. Id.
114. Id. at 141.
115. Id. at 143.
116. Id. at 138 (citing Flowers v. Owens, 274 F.R.D. 218, 225–26 (N.D. Ill. 2011)).
117. See id. (listing various definitions of the garden variety standard).
118. Id. at 139 (noting the lack of uniformity in judicial application of the garden variety standard
and that therefore “courts remain free to weed the garden as they will”).
119. Id. at 134 (“[T]he majority of the lower courts seem to be converging on the middle-ground,
or garden variety, approach.”).
120. S.B. 6027, 65th Leg., 2018 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018) (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.510 (2019)).
121. See S. Law & Just. Comm. Hearing, TVW.COM (JAN. 18, 2018), https://www.tvw.org/watch/?
eventID=2018011225 [https://perma.cc/SK8N-GT59] (statement of Sen. Kuderer).
122. Though no mention of Lodis appears in the bill reports, some observers recognized S.B.
6027 as a response to Lodis. See Christine Willmsen, New Washington State Law Bans Medical
Records from Open Court During Sexual Harassment Lawsuits, SEATTLE TIMES (June 2, 2018),
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/washington-state-bans-medical-records-from-opencourt-during-harassment-lawsuits/ [https://perma.cc/6E8J-W3PQ] (“The law’s passage stems from
and essentially reverses a 2013 state Court of Appeals Division I decision in Lodis v. Corbis
Holdings, Inc. . . . .”); see also S. Law & Just. Comm. Hearing, supra note 121.

18 - Miller(2).docx (Do Not Delete)

10/21/2019 5:27 PM

1464

[Vol. 94:1451

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

claiming noneconomic damages in a suit under the WLAD, “a claimant
does not place his or her health at issue or waive any health care
privilege under RCW 5.60.060 or 18.83.110.”123 The statute contains
three caveats that allow for privilege waiver.124 A plaintiff waives
privilege when they (1) allege “a specific diagnosable physical or
psychiatric injury as a proximate result of the respondents’ conduct,” (2)
rely “on the records or testimony of a health care provider or expert
witness” when seeking general damages, or (3) allege a “failure to
accommodate a disability or allege[] discrimination on the basis of a
disability.”125
While the Legislature was considering RCW 49.60.510, the Senate
Committee on Law & Justice held a public comment hearing.126 At the
hearing, Senator Patty Kuderer, the bill’s sponsor, testified.127 Senator
Kuderer practices as an attorney specializing in employment
discrimination.128 She testified that during her time as an employment
discrimination attorney, she witnessed inconsistencies in trial court
judges’ rulings concerning the disclosure of medical and mental
healthcare records during discovery.129 She further testified that some
judges went so far as to order the production of records going back to the
birth of the plaintiff.130 According to Senator Kuderer, these orders
chilled claims of sexual harassment.131 She also claimed that discovery
of medical and mental health records was used by defense attorneys as a
tactic to motivate plaintiffs to drop suits due to embarrassment.132
Senator Kuderer explained that one of the bill’s purposes was to
distinguish between what she called garden variety emotional distress
and specific, diagnosable emotional injuries, such as Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder or Acute Depression.133 According to Senator Kuderer,
the statute provides that when a plaintiff alleges garden variety

123. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.510(1) (2019).
124. Id. § 49.60.510(1)(a)-(c).
125. Id.
126. An Act Relating to the Discovery of Privileged Health Care Information and
Communications in Claims for Noneconomic Damages Under Certain Civil Rights Laws: Hearing
on S.B. 6027 Before the S. Law & Just. Comm., 65th Leg., 2018 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018).
127. See S. Law & Just. Comm. Hearing, supra note 121.
128. Id. (statement of Senator Kuderer).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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emotional distress, the plaintiff has not placed their health at issue in the
proceeding and should not therefore be deemed to have automatically
waived their privilege.134 Rather, the plaintiff should be allowed to
testify to how being subjected to discrimination affected them
emotionally.135 However, if a plaintiff alleges that the defendant’s
unlawful conduct caused a specific injury, then the plaintiff under the
proposed bill would thereby waive their privilege in the action.136
Waiver of the privilege only extends two years prior to the first
alleged unlawful act by the defendant.137 This time limitation prevents
overly-invasive discovery into the plaintiff’s past treatment.138 The bill
allows the court to extend beyond the two-year restriction should the
court find exceptional circumstances to do so.139
The passage of RCW 49.60.510 coincided with the #MeToo and
Time’s Up movements. RCW 49.60.510 echoes the movements’ desire
to protect against sexual harassment in the workplace and encourage
survivors to come forward with claims. Towards the end of 2017, in the
wake of allegations concerning Hollywood producer Harvey Weinstein,
the #MeToo movement gained national attention, bringing sexual
harassment and assault to the forefront.140 The movement addressed
pervasive sexual assault and harassment in American culture and
throughout the world.141 According to Facebook, “in less than 24 hours,
4.7 million people around the world ha[d] engaged in the ‘Me too’
conversation.”142
In response to the #MeToo movement, women in Hollywood
established the Time’s Up movement, which “can be thought of as a

134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.510(2)(a) (2019).
138. See S. Law & Just. Comm. Hearing, supra note 121.
139. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.510(2)(a). As of the date of publication, the author found no
cases explaining what “exceptional circumstances” means for the purposes of this statute.
140. Alix Langone, #MeToo and Time’s Up Founders Explain the Difference Between the 2
Movements — And How They’re Alike, TIME (Mar. 22, 2018), http://time.com/5189945/whats-thedifference-between-the-metoo-and-times-up-movements/ [https://perma.cc/QP58-EFVQ].
141. Elizabeth Chuck, #MeToo: Hashtag Becomes Anti-Sexual Harassment and Assault Rallying
Cry,
NBCNEWS.COM
(Oct.
16,
2017),
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/sexualmisconduct/metoo-hashtag-becomes-anti-sexual-harassment-assault-rallying-cry-n810986
[https://perma.cc/3RFK-U6WZ].
142. Cassandra Santiago & Doug Criss, An Activist, a Little Girl and the Heartbreaking Origin of
‘Me Too’, CNN.COM (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/17/us/me-too-tarana-burkeorigin-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/VQD5-8PPF].
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solution-based, action-oriented next step in the #Metoo movement.”143
Overall, the movement seeks to address issues in workplace equity.144
The initiative has several different goals, including “creating legislation
to combat sexual misconduct.”145
The #MeToo and Time’s Up movements did not escape attention in
the Washington State Legislature. Some 200 women signed a letter to
the State Legislature demanding a change to the capitol’s workplace
culture.146 Several bills were introduced in the 2018 legislative session to
address sexual harassment in the workplace.147 During the Senate
Committee on Law & Justice hearing on the privilege bill, Senator
Kuderer mentioned Time’s Up during her comments.148 In addition,
“during a public hearing about the bill, the chair of the House Judiciary
Committee, Rep. Laurie Jinkins . . . said ‘I guess we would call this the
Weinstein bill’ in reference to movie mogul Harvey Weinstein.”149 In
fact, Senator Kuderer believes the #MeToo movement was a
consideration for many legislators when the bill was passed.150 The
coincidence of the enactment of RCW 49.60.510 and the #MeToo and
Time’s Up movement may explain the ease with which the bill passed.
The bill received no amendments and was approved with forty-two votes
in favor and five opposed in the Senate, and ninety-seven votes in favor

143. Langone, supra note 140.
144. Id.
145. Jennifer Calfas, Hollywood Women Launch Time’s Up to End Sexual Harassment. Here’s
Their Plan, TIME (Jan. 2, 2018), http://time.com/5083809/times-up-hollywood-sexual-harassment/
[https://perma.cc/9D5B-K84V].
146. Joseph O’Sullivan, ‘It’s a Real Call to Action:’ 170 Women Sign Letter Speaking Out
Against Harassment at the Washington Legislature, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 6, 2017),
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/its-a-real-call-to-action-170-women-sign-letterspeaking-out-against-harassment-at-the-washington-legislature/ [https://perma.cc/AN2W-JSQ3].
147. Agueda Pacheco-Flores, Legislation in Olympia Targets Sexual Harassment in the
Workplace, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattlenews/politics/legislation-in-olympia-targets-sexual-harassment-in-the-workplace/
[https://perma.cc/U6Y9-RVDC].
148. See S. Law & Just. Comm. Hearing, supra note 121.
149. Christine Willmsen, New Washington State Law Bans Medical Records from Open Court
During
Sexual
Harassment
Lawsuits,
SEATTLE
TIMES
(June
2,
2018),
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/washington-state-bans-medical-records-from-opencourt-during-harassment-lawsuits/ [https://perma.cc/D84C-A6VV].
150. Id.
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and one opposed in the House.151 This near unanimity is notable despite
a similar bill failing the year before.152
Still, the statute failed to define “specific diagnosable physical or
psychiatric injury” and courts risk defeating the legislative goal by
misconstruing specific diagnosable injury.
IV. THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT BEHIND RCW 49.60.510
RCW 49.60.510 does not use the term “garden variety.”153 Despite no
mention of garden variety, the use of specific diagnosable injury is
consistent with the garden variety standard.154 Indeed, a number of
federal courts have used the term “diagnosable” as a way to differentiate
garden variety emotional responses from emotional responses that are
not garden variety.155 Although RCW 49.60.510’s use of “diagnosable
injury” is ambiguous, it should be understood as addressing the
dichotomy of incidental emotional distress. Even so, the statute leaves
open questions that litigants and courts will need to address going
forward. This Comment presents a framework to answer those questions.
Namely, courts should look to the garden variety distinction and the
policy debate it arose from in order to determine whether privilege
should be waived under the circumstances.
A.

Federal Courts’ Use of the Term “Diagnosable”

Federal courts employing the garden variety standard have used the
term “diagnosable” injury or “dysfunction” to differentiate between
garden variety and non-garden variety emotional responses. In these
circumstances, like RCW 49.60.510, privilege would be waived if the
plaintiff alleged a diagnosable injury or dysfunction, but not if the injury
was an emotional experience less than a diagnosable condition.
For example, in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v.
Nichols Gas & Oil, Inc.,156 a federal court, following the garden variety
151. S. 65-6027, 2018 Reg. Sess., at 2 (Wash. 2018); H. 65-6027, 2018 Reg. Sess., at 1 (Wash. 2018).
152. See S.B. 5566, 65th Leg., 2017 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017). But cf. S. Law & Just. Comm.
Hearing, supra note 121 (Senator Kuderer remarking that S.B. 5566 differed from S.B. 6027 in that
it addressed the admissibility rather than the discoverability of healthcare information).
153. See WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.510 (2019).
154. Id.
155. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Nichols Gas & Oil, Inc., 256 F.R.D. 114,
121 (W.D.N.Y. 2009); Doe v. Brunswick Sch. Dep’t, No. 2:15-CV-257-DBH, 2016 WL 8732370,
at *4 (D. Me. Apr. 29, 2016); Cadet v. Miller, CV 05-5042, 2007 WL 9706981, at *4 (E.D.N.Y.
Oct. 30, 2007).
156. 256 F.R.D. 114 (W.D.N.Y. 2009).
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waiver standard, articulated the distinction between garden variety and
non-garden variety by referencing “diagnosable dysfunction”:
Garden variety claims refer to claims for “compensation for
nothing more than the distress that any healthy, well-adjusted
person would likely feel as a result of being so victimized”;
claims for serious distress refer to claims for the “inducement or
aggravation of a diagnosable dysfunction or equivalent
injury.”157
One of the plaintiffs in Nichols Gas & Oil had been treated by a
physician for “work-related stress” and had been prescribed anti-anxiety
medication.158 However, the court noted that the complaint did not allege
any “specific injuries” and only claimed damages for “pain, suffering
and humiliation.”159 The plaintiff also “explicitly disavowed any
emotional distress claims other than garden variety claims.”160 The court,
therefore, held there was no waiver of psychotherapist-patient
privilege.161
In Doe v. Brunswick School Department,162 a federal court refused to
find a privilege waiver unless the plaintiff relied on expert testimony or
on a diagnosable injury to pursue damages.163 There, the plaintiff
brought a suit alleging that her son’s school had failed to stop other
students from harassing her son because of his perceived sexual
orientation.164 The plaintiff alleged that her son had been diagnosed with
depression and post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of the
defendant’s conduct.165 When the defendant sought production of
plaintiff’s son’s counseling records, the plaintiff offered to withdraw
claims “that might forfeit [the psychotherapist-patient] privilege” and
therefore would not “pursue any damage claims for medically
diagnosable (DSM) mental health conditions,” nor would the plaintiff
“rely on any medical or mental health experts” or their records to prove

157. Nichols Gas & Oil, 256 F.R.D. at 121 (W.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing Kunstler v. City of New
York, No. 04 CIV1145, 2006 WL 2516625, at *7, *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2006), aff’d, 242 F.R.D.
261 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)).
158. Id. at 117.
159. Id. at 121.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. No. 2:15-CV-257-DBH, 2016 WL 8732370, at *4 (D. Me. Apr. 29, 2016).
163. Id.
164. Id. at *1.
165. Id. at *2.
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damages.166 The judge held that the allegations of depression and posttraumatic stress disorder “would exceed garden variety emotional
damages”; however, since the plaintiff refused to rely on diagnosable
conditions or experts to prove damages, the plaintiff had sufficiently
limited herself to garden variety damages.167
In Davis v. Global Montello Group Corp.,168 a federal court followed
Doe in holding that, so long as the plaintiff was willing to abide by the
conditions used in Doe, the court would not find a waiver of
psychotherapist-patient privilege.169 Additionally, the court held that
waiver “turns not on a plaintiff’s characteristics or history but, rather, on
the nature of [their] claim—specifically, whether the plaintiff makes a
claim for emotional distress damages greater than those that any healthy,
well-adjusted person would suffer as a result of the conduct at issue.”170
Conversely, in Cadet v. Miller,171 a judge for the Eastern District of
New York held the plaintiff had waived her psychotherapist-patient
privilege when she alleged an intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim.172 The plaintiff’s complaint alleged that the defendant’s conduct
had upset the plaintiff “enough to consult with a clinical psychologist,
who diagnosed [them] as evidently suffering from post-traumatic stress
disorder.”173 The plaintiff attempted to prevent disclosure of portions of
their counseling records that they argued were not related to her claims
and were privileged from communication.174 The defendant argued that
the plaintiff had placed her health at issue and had waived her
privilege.175 The court considered the different waiver standards—broad,
narrow, and garden variety—and decided that it did not need to adopt
any particular one because the plaintiff had alleged a “serious
psychological injury, that is, the inducement or aggravation of a
diagnosable dysfunction or equivalent injury.”176

166. Id. at *3.
167. Id. at *4.
168. No. 2:16-cv-418-JDL, 2017 WL 875782, at *2 (D. Me. Mar. 3, 2017).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. CV 05-5042, 2007 WL 9706981, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2007).
172. Id.
173. Id. at *1.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at *4 (quoting Greenberg v. Smolka, No. 03 CIV. 8572, 2006 WL 1116521, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2006)).
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“Diagnosable” in these cases was used by the courts to differentiate
garden variety emotional experiences from non-garden variety emotional
experiences. A diagnosable injury or dysfunction is not a garden variety
emotional response. This suggests that the Washington Legislature was
attempting establish a similar privilege waiver framework by enacting
RCW 49.60.510.
B.

Non-Washington State Courts’ Use of “diagnosable”

A number of state courts have also used the “diagnosable” injury
distinction to tease out when waiver occurs.177 The use of “diagnosable”
in these instances is consistent with the federal garden variety standard,
finding waiver only when a plaintiff alleges an injury beyond the general
reaction of an average person.178
For example, in a factual situation similar to a typical claim under
WLAD, the Missouri Supreme Court held that claims of generic
emotional distress did not waive privilege.179 Missouri’s Human Rights
Act provides a private cause of action for discrimination in
“employment, public accommodation, and other interests,” and a
plaintiff bringing suit under the act may recover actual damages,
including emotional distress damages.180 Missouri’s privilege statutes
prevent
disclosure
of
physicianand
psychologist-patient
communications.181 Plaintiffs waive these privileges by placing their
health at issue.182 In the case before the Missouri Supreme Court, the
plaintiff responded to discovery by representing that she had not
received treatment for the emotional distress she suffered as a result of
the defendant’s conduct, that she had not sought a “dollar amount for
any item of emotional damage,” and that she was only seeking garden
variety emotional distress damages.183 The court ruled that the plaintiff
had not waived her privilege because she had “precluded herself from
offering any evidence that she sought treatment for emotional distress
and any evidence that she ha[d] any diagnosable condition allegedly

177. See State ex rel. Dean v. Cunningham, 182 S.W.3d 561 (Mo. 2006); Martin ex. rel. Martin v.
Town of Upton, No. CAWO200402162, 2007 WL 809818 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 2, 2007).
178. See supra sections II.A., II.B.
179. State ex rel. Dean, 182 S.W.3d at 569.
180. Id. at 565–66.
181. Id. at 566.
182. Id. at 567.
183. Id.
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resulting from the acts of discrimination or harassment.”184 The court
also held that the plaintiff could “seek damages for emotional distress of
a generic kind—that is, the kind of distress or humiliation that an
ordinary person would feel in such circumstances. These damages are
generally in the common experience of jurors and do not depend on any
expert evidence.”185
In Martin ex rel. Martin v. Town of Upton,186 the Superior Court of
Massachusetts considered motions to compel disclosure of psychological
treatment and counseling records.187 The plaintiff alleged that she
suffered nightmares and humiliation after having been injured by the
defendant’s negligence.188 In determining whether these allegations
amounted to a waiver of psychologist-patient privilege, the court looked
to Massachusetts’ jury instructions concerning damages, which stated:
“[m]ental pain and suffering includes any and all nervous shock, anxiety,
embarrassment or mental anguish resulting from the injury. Also, you
should take into account past, present and probable future mental
suffering.”189 The court held that the plaintiff would maintain her
privilege unless she took certain actions like calling an expert to testify
that she “suffered a mental health injury or developed a diagnosable
condition as a result of the defendant’s negligence.”190 It also held that:
Even if no expert witness testifies, the plaintiff or another
witness may make the plaintiff’s mental or emotional condition
an element of her claim by describing harm for which she seeks
compensation in the form of (1) extraordinary and chronic
mental pain and suffering, or (2) a specific injury or impairment
such as depression, a mood or relationship disorder, a fear,
phobia or aversion, or the functional equivalent of any one of
these conditions.191
Notably, the court did not consider anxiety to be something greater than
a garden variety response.192 These decisions further indicate a use of
“diagnosable” conditions or injuries as a way to determine whether a
plaintiff has alleged a non-garden variety emotional response. Also
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id. at 568.
Id. at 568.
No. CAWO200402162, 2007 WL 809818 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2007).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id. at *2.
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notably, Martin ex rel. Martin required a “specific injury,” which echoes
the use of “specific diagnosable injury” in RCW 49.60.510.193 Also,
while Martin ex rel. Martin appears to consider “extraordinary and
chronic mental pain and suffering” to be a diagnosable condition, its
distinction between that and other “specific” injuries could be construed
to suggest “extraordinary and chronic mental pain and suffering” is not a
specific injury.194 Thus, if a court interpreted RCW 49.60.510 similarly,
then waiver would only occur if the plaintiff alleged something specific
like depression or a phobia.
C.

Washington’s Adoption of the Garden Variety Distinction

RCW 49.60.510’s legislative history demonstrates an intent by the
Washington State Legislature to establish a compromise akin to the
garden variety standard. In large part, the garden variety standard
developed as a way to appease both sides of the privilege policy debate.
It occupies a middle ground approach by allowing some plaintiffs to
claim non-economic emotional distress damages without waiving
privilege, while still recognizing waiver under certain circumstances.195
There is ample evidence demonstrating that the Washington State
Legislature had similar desires when it enacted RCW 49.60.510.
The statute’s plain language contemplates situations when a plaintiff
waives privilege and when a plaintiff does not.196 This is consistent with
the general principles of the garden variety standard.197 The
Legislature’s apparent abrogation of Lodis also shows that the
Legislature intended RCW 49.60.510 to adopt a compromise similar to
the garden variety standard.198 Finally, the use of “diagnosable” in
garden variety case law as a way to differentiate incidental emotional
distress from more severe emotional distress further solidifies the
Legislature’s intent to adopt a standard similar to the widely used garden
variety standard.199
193. Id. at *3.
194. Id.
195. See Anderson, supra note 7, at 137.
196. See WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.510 (2019).
197. See supra sections II.A., II.B.
198. Compare Lodis v. Corbis Holdings, Inc., 172 Wash. App. 835, 855, 292 P.3d 779, 791
(2013) (“Thus, when a plaintiff puts his mental health at issue by alleging emotional distress, he
waives his psychologist-patient privilege for relevant mental health records.”), with WASH. REV.
CODE § 49.60.510(1) (“By requesting noneconomic damages under this chapter, a claimant does not
place his or her health at issue or waive any health care privilege . . . .” ).
199. See supra sections IV.A., IV.B.
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Although the Washington statute differs from other jurisdictions that
use the garden variety standard in that the words “garden variety” do not
appear in RCW 49.60.510, the dissimilarity is ultimately a red herring.
In essence, both standards attempt to differentiate incidental emotional
distress from severe emotional distress. Thus, generally speaking, both
standards seek to waive privilege only in situations where plaintiffs seek
damages for a relatively severe form of emotional distress. “Diagnosable
injury” is one standard to accomplish that goal. “Garden variety” is
another.
Given that both standards seek to protect privilege in situations where
plaintiffs claim generalized emotional distress damages, Washington
courts and practitioners should approach RCW 49.60.510 against the
backdrop of the garden variety standard and the policy debate from
which it arose. Under RCW 49.60.510, plaintiffs should be able to claim
incidental emotional distress damages in most circumstances without
waiving privilege. However, since the new standard is ambiguous as to
what exactly constitutes a “diagnosable injury,” it remains unclear how
the statute will be applied in practice. Therefore, courts and practitioners
should use the garden variety distinction as guidance in interpreting
specific diagnosable injury.
D.

Risks of Misconstruing Statute

Washington courts’ primary function in construing statutes is to carry
out the intent of the Legislature.200 Courts will need to be cognizant of
the Legislature’s intentions behind the garden variety compromise to
properly enforce the statute. Without such an understanding, courts risk
backsliding towards a Lodis-era standard in direct contravention of the
Legislature’s intention to maintain privilege in some cases, even if a
plaintiff claims emotional distress damages. Without keeping in mind
this compromise, courts will likely fail to define specific diagnosable
injury in a way that allows plaintiffs to claim any form of emotional
distress damages based on relatively general emotional injuries.
For example, a recent Washington Superior Court decision, Tao v.
Seattle City Light,201 ruled that “mere lay assertions of a psychiatric
injury” were equivalent to alleging a specific diagnosable psychiatric
injury and, therefore, the plaintiff had waived her psychotherapy
privilege.202 In that case, the plaintiff alleged they suffered from anxiety
200. State, Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash. 2d 1, 10, 43 P.3d 4, 9 (2002).
201. No. 17-2-14287-5, 2019 WL 3333891 (Wash. Super. Ct. Apr. 10, 2019).
202. Id. at *1.
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and depression.203 Importantly, the court did not engage in any
legislative history analysis because the court found the plain language
did not “distinguish between mere lay assertions of a psychiatric injury
and an actual, diagnosed injury.”204
While the Tao Court found the statute’s meaning plain on its face,205
its holding risks defeating the Legislature’s goal in enacting RCW
49.60.510. The Tao Court may have reached a different result had it
considered the garden variety standard. For example, a federal district
court in McKenna v. Cruz206 recognized in dicta that a “specific,
diagnosable mental condition” is distinct from “generalized anxiety and
emotional upset.”207 Although this federal court rejected adoption of the
garden variety standard,208 the court’s holding indicates that the term
“specific” requires more than just “mere lay assertions.”209
Certainly, the decision in McKenna does not clearly demonstrate that
the Washington Superior Court misconstrued the statute. Nor is it
evident that finding waiver under such circumstances was the wrong
result. However, the McKenna court’s recognition that general assertions
of anxiety might not amount to a specific, diagnosable injury does
demonstrate that the language of the statute was not “plain.” Courts
should therefore pause and consider the legislative history before
construing RCW 49.60.510 broadly. The announced legislative purpose
was to limit waiver of privilege to confined circumstances while
allowing a plaintiff to claim emotional distress damages and testify
about their emotional experience.210 In fact, the bill’s sponsor, Senator
Kuderer, specifically stated that a plaintiff would need to allege
something like “Acute Depression” or “PTSD” in order to waive
privilege.211 If courts follow the trajectory of Tao and continue to find
waiver without consulting the garden variety backdrop, then the courts
may functionally eviscerate the demarcation the Legislature was trying
to draw.

203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Washington courts only look to legislative history if the statute is ambiguous. See Columbia
Riverkeeper v. Port of Vancouver USA, 188 Wash. 2d 421, 435, 395 P.3d 1031, 1038 (2017).
206. No. 98 CIV. 1853, 1998 WL 809533 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 1998).
207. Id. at *2.
208. Id. at *3.
209. Tao, 2019 WL 3333891, at *1.
210. See supra section III.
211. See S. Law & Just. Comm. Hearing, supra note 121.
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Ultimately, much of the uncertainty regarding the bounds of waiver
under RCW 49.60.510 results from the Legislature’s failure to define
“specific diagnosable injury.” Without a practical definition, courts risk
misconstruing the statute and finding waiver when the Legislature
intended there to be none. However, if courts consider the legislative
history—and therefore the garden variety distinction—when interpreting
RCW 49.60.510, they will go a long way towards carrying out the
legislative purpose.
CONCLUSION
Until courts determine what constitutes an allegation of a specific
diagnosable injury, plaintiffs and defendants alike will be unsure how
privilege operates under WLAD. Federal and some foreign state case
law may assist in determining the bounds of the statute. However, the
case law does not provide easily applicable standards and Washington
state courts will need to develop a way to differentiate diagnosable
injuries from other emotional experiences. This Comment provides the
background for that analysis. Until then, plaintiffs will likely do best by
avoiding trigger words like “depression,” even though these words have
an everyday non-clinical use. Defendants, on the other hand, will likely
question at what point the allegations of “feelings” turn to specific
diagnosable injuries. Either way, the statute’s ambiguity undermines its
intended purpose: to provide plaintiffs with peace of mind that their
communications with psychologists and physicians remain private. As
Justice Stevens wrote in Jaffee, “if the purpose of the privilege is to be
served, the participants in the confidential conversation ‘must be able to
predict with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will
be protected.’”212

212. Jaffee v. Redmond 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S.
383, 393 (1981)).

